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Editorial
07/2005 |
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The multi-layered notion of ownership
As any therapist will tell you, dysfunctional families are hard to set straight. And many a good sociologist will happily explain why that is so. Interventions in information-processing systems are failure-prone. All family members, after all, make up their own minds about what is going on – and their interpretation is likely to diverge from one another’s, and even more so from the therapist’s intentions.
Successful development implies a transformation of society. Such a process is far more complex than coming to terms in a disorderly family. Unsurprisingly, attempts to micro-manage entire countries from outside have failed. In the 1980s and 1990s, the donor community – spearheaded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – imposed strict conditions in the context of “structural adjustment policies”, but failed to bring about economic miracles. Too often, the results were stagnation, poverty and debt.
Today’s development debate revolves around the term “ownership”, emphasising the insight that complex systems operate according to their own logic. Nations and states are, in the end, self-regulating entities. Without their own, meaningful contribution, there will not be any progress. Donors thus face a dilemma. They want developing countries to perform well, but in spite of all their power, they need country ownership for that to happen – just as therapists need the cooperation of their clients.
Whereas therapists are normally paid for their work, in development contexts, the donors provide the funds. Indeed, many “clients” even depend on them. And yet, donors cannot achieve their goals with demands and directives. That does not work when dealing with complex social systems. Nor does it make much sense to restrict assistance to individual projects – as these do not have much impact on society as a whole. If development is to succeed, there is no alternative to ownership.
Donors, however, cannot hand out funds unconditionally. They are themselves responsible to the public, to legislators and – in the case of multilateral institutions – to member governments. The European Commission has thus begun measuring performance in recipient countries and is spending an increasing share of its aid according to the progress made (Petra Schmidt, p. 276). Similarly, the World Bank is no longer trying to cajole countries to additional reforms. If at all, it wants to impose conditions in support of country-owned programmes (Stefan Koeberle, p. 280). Nonetheless, the focus on country ownership goes along with a donor aspiration for more influence. When a government’s budget is supported from outside, issues of governance almost automatically show up on the common agenda of donors and recipients providing a so far unknown scope to delve into domestic matters of poor countries (Jürgen Zattler, p. 283).
The new policies are still evolving. At an InWEnt conference in Berlin in April, it became obvious, that the debate is intellectually fascinating. And yet, one should remember that rich and poor countries do not only interact in the aid arena. There are other matters of global relevance – such as trade, environment or security. In these fields, donor countries tend to act more self-serving, all too often undermining their very own development efforts. Critics from civil society have a point when they state that technical details of conditionality are not what matters primarily – the real issue at stake is trustworthy international relations (Peter Lanzet, p. 288).
For good performers, moreover, conditionality becomes burdensome. Officials from Tanzania have begun complaining about the multitude of donor expectations, stating that the country will only accept aid if it fits in with national priorities and procedures (interview with Peniel M. Lyimo, p. 286). The tougher questions, however, concern countries that are considered mediocre and poor performers, or even failed states. It is no coincidence that the new debt relief initiative the G8 announced last month only involves countries believed to be on a healthy path.
What should the international community do in the other cases? Empirically there are two options – neglect and military intervention. Michael Hofmann, Director General at the German Development Ministry, speaks of the danger that the imposition of protectorates may become the dark flipp-side of (failed) ownership. He does not consider military force an attractive option. In development terms, after all, it sends all actors back to square one. As any therapist will tell you, there is no way to coerce a dysfunctional social system to do better.
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Dr. Hans Dembowski
Editor in Chief of D+C Development and Cooperation/E+Z Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit
euz.editor@fsd.de
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