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Aid for the fractured societies of fragile states


02/2007
  

[ Development strategy ]

Aid for fractured societies

The term “fragile state” is a vague one. It does not precisely indicate difficulties which exist in all countries affected by the phenomenon. Instead the term refers somewhat vaguely to the collapse of the social contract. If donors want to contribute to making possible healthy and sustainable development again, they must pay attention to the societal specifics of any given crisis.


[ By Hervé Magro ]

Because of the phenomenon’s dimensions and consequences, the challenge posed by “fragile states” to official development assistance (ODA) of the international community is a massive one. The major bilateral and multilateral donors have defined strategies for cooperation with fragile states, and are supporting such countries with specific programmes and services.

Despite such widespread interest in the issue, however, there is no consensus as to what exactly constitutes “fragile” states. Donors vary in how they assess the risks that emanate from fragile sates and in what course of action they opt for. Some donors are particularly interested in the functional dimension, focussing on governmental capacities. Others, in contrast, stress security aspects, emphasising the threats fragile states pose at the internal, regional and global levels.

This article does not intend to propose a conclusive definition of the term “fragile state”. Rather, the intention is to outline the term’s shortcomings and to discuss the implications for objectives and methods of development cooperation. It is important to understand that fragile states suffer from deep, underlying societal fissures, and that the principles of “local ownership” and democratic participation are indispensable.

Donors have been dealing with the problem of failed and collapsed states since the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. Recent debate proves that decision-makers attach increasing importance to preventive action as part of development cooperation in order to avoid further cases of crisis.

The term “fragile state” is vague and refers to very different situations and circumstances. These not only include post-conflict transitions, armed conflict, humanitarian crises and the risk of terrorist cells forming, but also (re-)construction of infrastructures and the fight against extreme poverty. In view of such complexity, it is hardly possible to tackle all relevant aspects in a single, precise definition for fragile state”.

Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between what causes fragility and what is merely a symptom. On top of that, the term deals with phenomena which are neither new (such as lack of capacity, poverty, inadequate security), nor apply exclusively to poor countries. Developed nations are also affected by these phenomena, if perhaps only to a lesser extent. In many cases, talk of a state’s fragility is felt to be stigmatising and, to say the least, one should doubt whether this connotation will contribute to fostering a sense of “local ownership”. It is essential, however, that the population affected identify with reform programmes, if donor-supported efforts to improve their situation are to succeed. In short, the needs and expectations of the people affected must be taken into account.

One aspect common to all current definitions of fragility is the inability of states to make full use of resources in general, and of the aid they receive in particular. Political obstacles play a role, as do institutional ones. Of course, it makes a difference whether a country is not implementing reforms because
– its government does not have the will to do so,
– does not have the legitimacy to do so, or
– does not have institutions capable enough for doing so.

There is a risk of donors only cooperating with developing countries marked by a promising policy environment. That approach, however, would compound problems arising from the widening gulf between “donor darlings”, which receive extensive aid, and “donor orphans”, which must make do without support. Not only would difficulties in the crisis countries intensify further, but their neighbours would also be exposed to the growing danger of spill-over effects (including refugees, violence, illegal trade of all kinds, famine and environmental harm). Fragile states are in particular need of sustained donor commitment. This insight is reflected in the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” drawn up by the OECD

In this context, policy approaches that primarily emphasise state capacities (in socio-economic as well as security terms) cannot suffice. While it is highly welcome that donors have rediscovered the relevance of state institutions for stabilisation, it will simply not do to merely focus on providing public services (such as fundamental social services, security, justice et cetera). After all, the challenge of fragility extends well beyond the strict context of a state’s core functions, as the problems affect a country in its entirety. Failure to comprehend this complexity will make it impossible to understand development dynamics even in the medium-term, not to speak of effectively supporting healthy trends in the long run.


When social contracts fail

The fragility of a society and its people is a feature common to all fragile states (Châtaigner and Magro, 2007). Among the causes are extended periods of conflict, poverty, lack of prospects and an inability to harness the opportunities of globalisation. The result is the collapse of the social contract as well as social cohesion, when people no longer identify with their state. Typically, they will feel neglected by a class of political leaders who appear to have lost all interest in the fate of the population.

Fragile states thus correlate with fragile societies. Both phenomena are interdependent. Accordingly, one must reconsider the relationship of state and society as well as the contribution ODA can make. While the state does remain the prime point of reference, it is necessary to re-examine the role it should play in development. In this setting, “democratic governance” is a notion that can help to design innovative strategies for tackling the problems that go along with fragility.

The guiding principles of “democratic governance” are participation, public accountability and transparency. The concept is not about pitting civil society against the state. Rather, the goal should be to create interfaces for dialogue and to enable the local population to take part in decision-making. The individual must be reaffirmed, both in the roles of agent and beneficiary of development efforts.

According to this approach, re-establishment and strengthening of state capacities are reflected in the way in which the state carries out its mediating role and upholds the common good, equal opportunities and justice. A government’s legitimacy does not merely hinge on elections. It also depends on whether citizens enjoy rights and are in a position to hold the state to account. In countries affected by fragility, all tiers of government (local, regional, national) are relevant. Accordingly, it is decisive to enhance human and institutional capacities at all levels.

This approach strives for a balance of democratic participation and people’s welfare and security on the one hand and the use of repressive powers on the other. It is about comprehensive action, bearing in mind societal, political and economic causes of fragility.

Donors can support transformation in this sense. However, there are no ready-made governance models which could simply be applied. Each society must establish specific procedures and institutions that correspond to its needs, while complying with the standards defined by international treaties and agreements. The notion of democratic governance supports development in this sense, fully applying the principle local ownership.

No doubt, this approach is comprehensive and demanding. However, it should enable donors to support well-designed reform programmes over the long run, with the goal of consolidating statehood and enhancing social cohesion.


Hervé Magro
works at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is Deputy Director of the Democratic Governance Section in the Department for Development Policies. He is writing here in a personal capacity and is not expressing official policy of the French government. herve.magro@diplomatie.gouv.fr



References:
Châtaigner, Jean-Marc and Hervé Magro (ed.), 2007:
Étas et sociétés fragiles. Entre conflit, reconstruction et développement. Paris : Karthala